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Abstract
Although the growth of share-based payments with performance conditions
(hereafter, SPPC ) is prominent today, the theoretical price of SPPC has not
been sufficiently studied. Reflecting such a situation, the current accounting
standards for share-based payments issued in 2004 have had many problems.
This paper develops a theoretical SPPC price model with a framework for a
marginal utility-based price, which previous studies proposed is the price of
contingent claims in an incomplete market. This paper’s contribution is fivefold.
First, we restricted the stochastic process to a certain class to demonstrate how
to consistently change all variables’ probability distributions, which affect the
SPPC payoff. Second, we explicitly indicated not only the stochastic processes of
the stock price process and performance variables under the changed probability,
but also how the changes in the performance variables’ drift coefficients related to
stock betas. Third, we proposed a convenient model in application that uses only
a few parameters. Fourth, we provided a method to estimate the parameters and
improve the estimation of both the price and parameters. Fifth, we illustrated
the problems in current accounting standards and indicated how the theoretical
price model can significantly improve them.
Keywords: Share-based payment; performance-based vesting condition; em-
ployee stock options; Statement of Financial Accounting Standards; theoretical
price; fair value; incomplete market.
1 Introduction
Share-based payments with performance conditions (hereafter, SPPC ) have ex-
perienced prominent growth. According to Pay Governance LLC,1 Today, more
than 80% of S&P 500 companies use a variety of LTI performance plans. The
SPPC provides some benefits, such as stocks or stock options, which are vested
when such performance variables as net profit or the earnings per share achieve
predetermined goals.
However, unlike the standard stock option, the SPPC’s theoretical price has
not been sufficiently studied. In fact, a May 2018 Google Scholar search for
1http://paygovernance.com/considering-performance-stock-options
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a combination of performance conditions and theoretical price as well as per-
formance conditions and share-based payment and theoretical value produced
virtually no results.
Reflecting such a theoretically unresolved state, the current accounting stan-
dards on share-based payments, issued in 2004, are as follows: The fair value
under the current standards is measured without performance conditions on a
grant date, and whether the fair value is recognized as compensation cost is left
to whether the company believes achieving the goal is probable. When judged
as probable, the fair value is allocated as compensation cost over the relevant
periods, and if the goal is ultimately impossible, the already recognized costs
are immediately reversed. Alternatively, when this is judged as improbable, no
expenses are recognized, and when the goal is ultimately possible, the unrecog-
nized costs are immediately recognized.
Current accounting standards have various problems due to the uncertainty
of cost recognition, and as the recognition at the grant date is left to the
company’s judgement. Such issues include volatile compensation cost, over-
recognition of compensation cost, inconsistency with accounting objectives, a
distortion of the company’s optimal selection of an award of equity instruments
and the significant volatility of a difficult project’s compensation cost. These
problems can substantially improve if we use this paper’s theoretical pricing as
the fair value and always recognize compensation cost on the grant date; we will
discuss this in detail in Section 5.
The SPPC’s payoff depends on performance variables as well as stock prices.
As performance variables cannot be traded on the market, the SPPC’s theoret-
ical price is the theoretical price of a contingent claim in an incomplete market.
This paper adopts a marginal utility-based price, which previous studies posit is
the theoretical price of a contingent claim in an incomplete market (Davis 1997,
Hugonnier et al. 2005). It is a price at which an investorwho maximizes his or
her expected utility by only trading with a money market account and tradable
stockscannot improve the expected utility by buying or selling the contingent
claim.
Previous studies’ primary results that relate to the theme of this paper are
as follows:
1. The marginal utility-based price is a general concept for both complete
and incomplete markets, as it coincides with arbitrage-free pricing in a
complete market.
2. The marginal utility-based price is the expected value of the contingent
claim payoff’s present value multiplied by a random variable. This random
variable is an optimal solution to the dual problem associated with the
expected utility maximization (Hugonnier et al. 2005).
3. Generally, the optimal solution to the dual problem depends on the utility
function and initial wealth
However, prior works have not sufficiently and explicitly studied how to
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solve the dual problem and obtain a marginal utility-based price. This paper’s
contribution is fivefold.
1. We restrict the stock price and performance variable’s stochastic processes
to a class driven by Brownian motion. With an additional assumption that
is unrestrictive in its application, we explicitly solve the dual problem and
reveal that the optimal solution depends neither on the utility function
nor the initial wealth, and that the optimal solution is a Radon-Nikodm
derivative of the new probability Q with respect to the original probability
P.
2. We then explicitly illustrate the stochastic stock price and performance
variable processes under Q. The processes’ drift coefficients are equal to
a quantity obtained by subtracting the product of the stock price’s beta
(which will be accurately discussed in Section 3) and the expected excess
returns of stocks from the original drift coefficients. New drift coefficients
of stock price coincide with the risk-free rate minus the dividend yield,
which is the same conclusion as in the complete market. The new dis-
covery in this work is that the change in the performance variable’s drift
coefficient relates to the stock’s betas.
3. We demonstrate that with an additional assumption, which is unrestrictive
in its application, we can obtain a convenient model that uses only a few
parameters.
4. As the SPPC’s theoretical price is the expected value under Q, we must use
the Monte Carlo method in most cases. Thus, we propose some control
variables to improve the estimation accuracy of the theoretical price as
well as the parameters used in the model.
5. We demonstrate that existing accounting standards are highly problematic
due to the SPPC’s lack of a theoretical price; we can greatly improve these
standards by adopting this paper’s theoretical price as the fair value.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the previous studies
for both complete and incomplete markets, to the extent necessary to analyze
the SPPC’s price. Section 3 restricts the stochastic process to the class driven
by Brownian motion with some additional assumptions, and we derive primary
theorems as the basis to calculate the price. Section 4 formulates the SPPC
and derives its theoretical price. Further, we introduce a period-product, a use-
ful concept, and explain its use. Section 5 analyzes the problems with current
accounting standards and how this paper’s theoretical price model could signif-
icantly improve them. Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous Studies’ Primary Results
First, we explain the concept of a marginal utility-based price (Davis 1997).
Suppose an investor maximizes the expected utility from the terminal wealth
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by investing the initial wealth in a money market account and stocks (or trad-
able assets). Further, suppose the investor receives a proposal to buy or sell a
contingent claim at price p. If the investor can improve the expected utility by
buying some amount of the claims, we consider p as inexpensive. Conversely,
if the investor can improve the expected utility by selling some amount of the
claim short, we consider p as expensive. A fair price p based on the investor’s
expected utility is a price at which the investor neither buys nor sells the claim
short. If p is at such a level, the marginal utility due to buying (or selling
short) a small amount q of the claim is equal to the marginal utility due to
the decrease (or increase) of wealth invested in the tradable assets. This is the
marginal utility-based price.
In a complete market, the marginal utility-based price and an arbitrage-free
price coincide. The payoff of the claim itself does not affect investors’ expected
utility, as it can be completely replicated by trading the tradable assets. Only
the difference between p and the arbitrage-free price (the replication cost) c
matters. If p is higher (or lower) than c, the investors can use p − c (or c − p,
respectively) to improve the expected utility. The price at which the investor
cannot improve the expected utility coincides with an arbitrage-free price.
Thus, we formulate the following: One money market account and m stocks
exist, which are tradable on the market; we call these tradable assets. Their
price processes on the filtered probability space
(
Ω, F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P
)
are the
adapted semi-martingale S0 and Si (1 ≤ i ≤ m), respectively. We denote by
Di (1 ≤ i ≤ m), an accumulated dividend process that expresses the total div-
idend from time 0 to time t. We denote all stock price processes and total ac-
cumulated dividend processes by the Rm-valued processes S = (S1, · · · , Sm)
⊤
and D = (D1, · · · , Dm)
⊤, respectively. Further, F = FT and Ft satisfies the
usual conditions (right continuous, and F0 contains all null sets of F).
We introduce the following definitions:
Definition 2.1 (Trading Strategy). The stochastic processesH0,H = (H1, . . . , Hm)
⊤
are predictable processes, respectively representing the holding amounts of a
money-market account and stocks; thus, we call
(
H0,H
⊤
)
or H a trading strat-
egy (or a strategy, for brevity).
Definition 2.2 (Admissible Strategy). A set of wealth processes that can be
realized by some strategy with the initial wealth x is
X (x) :=
{
X ≥ 0;Xt = x+
∫ t
0
H0udS0u +
∫ t
0
H⊤u (dSu + dDu)
}
. (2.1)
We call X ∈ X (x) or H generating X an admissible strategy.
When we use S0t as a numeraire, we denote the relative prices for 1 ≤
i ≤ m by S˜it := Sit/S0t , the relative accumulated dividend processes by
D˜it := Dit/S0t , and a set of relative wealth processes by X˜ (x) := X (x)/S0 .
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S˜ =
(
S˜1, · · · , S˜m
)
and D˜ =
(
D˜1, · · · , D˜m
)
. By definition, S˜0t = 1. Further,
X˜ (x) :=
{
X˜ ≥ 0; X˜t = x+
∫ t
0
Hu
(
dS˜u + dD˜u
)}
. (2.2)
Clearly, X ∈ X (x) and X˜ ∈ X˜ (x) are self-financing portfolios; further, X (x) =
xX (1) and X˜ (x) = xX˜ (1).
Definition 2.3 (Maximal Strategy). We call X ∈ X (x) a maximal strategy if
its terminal value cannot be dominated by that of any other strategy in X (x),
namely, if X ′ ∈ X (x) and XT ≤ X
′
T imply X
′ = X .
Definition 2.4 (Acceptable Strategy). We call a strategy X an acceptable
strategy if it has a decomposition of the form X = X ′ − X ′′, where X ′ is an
admissible strategy and X ′′ is a maximal strategy.
For details on maximal and acceptable strategies, see Delbaen & Schachermayer
(1997).
We call a probability measure Q an equivalent local martingale measure if
it is equivalent to P and if every X˜ ∈ X˜ (1) is a local martingale under Q. We
denote by M the family of all such measures.
Definition 2.5 (Set of the Equivalent Local Martingale Measure).
M :=
{
Q ≈ P; every X˜ ∈ X˜ (1) is a local martingale under Q
}
. (2.3)
We denote the investor’s utility from the terminal wealth XT > 0 by the
utility function U : (0,∞) → R. We suppose the investor has some initial
wealth x and trades the tradable assets to maximize the expected utility from
the terminal wealth. The maximal expected utility for this investor is given by
u (x) := sup
X˜∈X˜ (1)
U
(
xS0T X˜T
)
. (2.4)
We call (2.4) a primary problem.
We then define the dual problem associated with (2.4). The objective func-
tion of the dual problem is a conjugate function of U and we denote it by
V : (0,∞)→ R:
V (y) := sup
x>0
(U (x)− xy) . (2.5)
The constraint set of the dual problem is
Y˜ (y) :=
{
Y˜ ≥ 0; Y˜0 = y and X˜Y˜ =
(
X˜tY˜t
)
0≤t≤T
is a super martingale
for every X˜ ∈ X˜ (1)
}
.
(2.6)
5
The dual problem is a minimization problem:
v (y) := inf
Y˜ ∈Y˜(1)
V
(
yY˜TS
−1
0T
)
. (2.7)
We now list the assumptions we will use.
Assumption 2.1. 2
M 6= ∅. (2.8)
Assumption 2.2. 1. The utility fuinction U is a strictly increasing, strictly
concave, and continuously differentiable function.
2. Further, U satisfies the Inada conditions:
lim
x→∞
U ′ (x) = 0, lim
x→0
U ′ (x) =∞. (2.9)
Assumption 2.3. 3
sup
Y˜ ∈Y(1)
E
[
Y˜TS
−1
0T
]
<∞. (2.10)
Assumption 2.4.
u (x) <∞ for some x > 0. (2.11)
The results of previous studies related to this paper’s theme involve the
following Lemmas 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.
Lemma 2.1 (An Incomplete Market). Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and
2.4, the following claims hold:
1. A unique optimal solution Y ∗ (y) ∈ Y (1) to the dual problem (2.7) exists
for any y > 0.
2. If lim
x→∞
xU ′ (x)/U (x) < 1, then a unique optimal solution X˜∗ (x) ∈ X (1)
to the primary problem (2.4) exists for any x > 0. If y = u′ (x), we have
U ′
(
xX˜
∗
(x)S0T
)
S0T = yY˜
∗ (y) . (2.12)
2Delbaen & Schachermayer (1994) proved that Assumption 2.1 and no free lunch with
vanishing risk” are equivalent conditions.
3Kramkov & Schachermayer (1999) used the investor’s utility function of the terminal
relative wealth X˜T . As a result, they formulated the dual problem as infY˜ ∈Y˜(1)E
[
V
(
yY˜
)]
.
Further, they use the property suph∈D(1)E [h] ≤ 1 (with the variables h, D (1), and C (1) as
described below as the variables used in their paper) for the proof of Lemmas 3.4 and 3.7 in
their paper. This paper used the investor’s utility function of the terminal nominal wealth
XT . As a result, the dual problem changes to inf Y˜ ∈Y˜(1)E
[
V
(
yY˜ S−10T
)]
. Assumption 3 is
necessary to play the same role as suph∈D(1)E [h] ≤ 1 above. In their paper, suph∈D(1)E [h] ≤
1 is not an assumption, but the result of C (1) containing a constant process 1. Alternatively,
this paper’s Assumption 2.3 cannot be derived from other assumptions, so this needs to be
an additional assumption.
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Proof. See Kramkov & Schachermayer’s (1999) Theorems 2.1 and 2.2.
Lemma 2.2 (A Complete Market). Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4,
if a market is complete, namely, if M is a singleton, a unique optimal solution
to the primary problem (2.1) exists for any x > 0. If y = u′ (x), we have
U ′
(
xX˜
∗
(x)S0T
)
S0T = y
dQ
dP
(2.13)
where dQ/dP is a Radon-Nikodm derivative of Q with respect to P, where Q is a
unique element of M.
Proof. See Kramkov & Schachermayer’s (1999) Theorem 2.0.
Next, we define a marginal utility-based price. We denote the payoff of a
contingent claim that is paid at time T by an FT measurable random variable
B. For (x, q) ∈ R2, we denote by X (x, q |B ) the set of acceptable strategies
whose initial wealth is x and terminal welth plus qB is non-negative; specifically,
X (x, q |B ) := {X is an acceptable strategy with X0 = x and XT + qB ≥ 0} .
(2.14)
Definition 2.6 (A Marginal Utility-Based Price). Suppose the claim B ∈ L0,
and x > 0. The price of the claim p is the marginal utility-based price of B
given the initial wealth x if
E [U (XT + qB)] ≤ u (x) for ∀q ∈ R, ∀X ∈ X (x− pq, q |B ) . (2.15)
The right side is the maximal expected utility from the tradable assets, and
the left side is the expected utility when investing pq in the claim with the
remaining in the tradable assets. Equation (2.15) signifies that the investor
cannot improve the expected utility regardless of the amount q that is added to
the portfolio if p is the marginal utility-based price.
The following Lemma 2.3 combines the expected utility maximization prob-
lem with the price of a contingent claim.
Lemma 2.3. Suppose Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 hold, and v (y) < ∞.
Let X ∈ X (1) as an arbitrary maximal strategy. If Y˜ ∗ (y) X˜ is a uniformly
integrable martingale, a contingent claim B, such as |B| ≤ aXT for some con-
stant a > 0, has a unique marginal utility-based price p (B |x ). This p (B |x) is
given by the following equation:
p (B |x) = E
[
Y˜ ∗T (y)BS
−1
0T
]
. (2.16)
Proof. See Hugonnier et al. (2005) Theorem 3.1(i).
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If Y˜ ∗ (y) is a uniformly integrable martingale, it corresponds to a Radon-
Nikodm derivative process of some equivalent local martingale measure Q ∈M;
thus, the right side of (2.16) can be expressed as EQ
[
BS−10T
]
, where EQ [ · ] ex-
presses the expected value under Q. However, Y˜ ∗ (y) is generally not necessarily
a uniformly integrable martingale, so we cannot express the right side of (2.16)
as an expected value under some measure. It is simply the expected value of
the payoff’s present value multiplied by Y˜ ∗ (y) under the original measure.
In a complete market, Y˜ ∗T (y) coincides with the unique Radon-Nikodm
derivative dQ/dP . Thus, we observe (2.16) is an extension of the theoreti-
cal price formula in a complete market to an incomplete market.
If Y˜ ∗T (y) is specified, we can calculate the theoretical price. However, it is
difficult to explicitly calculate Y˜ ∗T (y). We solve the dual problem by specifying
the set Y˜ (1) as well as the value function u (·) of the primary problem. However,
specifying u (·) amounts to solving the primary problem, which is only possible
after we solve the dual problem. Therefore, the solution is cyclical, and it is not
possible to specify Y˜ ∗T (y) in a general case.
Previous studies have attempted to solve this problem by restricting the
utility function to a certain class. For example, Davis (1997) solved for a log
utility function, Frittelli (2000) solved for an exponential utility function, and
Henderson (2002) solved for a power and exponential utility function. How-
ever, it is seemingly difficult to reach an agreement regarding an application in
which these utility functions are appropriate. Further, if we deny these utility
functions, we must specify the utility function, its risk aversion parameter, and
initial wealth size, which makes it more difficult to reach an agreement a fortiori.
We propose another solution, in that we will restrict the stochastic process
instead of the utility function to a certain class. We can indicate that such a
restriction is not restrictive, and hence, aggregable in application for the SPPC’s
theoretical price. Section 3 further explains this solution.
3 The Stock Price and Performance Variable
Model
3.1 The stochastic processes
Henceforth, we suppose the stochastic processes that the d-dimensional Brow-
nian motions drive. Consider the setting of (3.1), which consists of one money
market account, m stocks, and d−m performance variables.
dS0t = S0trtdt,
dSt = diag (St) (btdt+Σtdwt) ,
dPt = diag (Pt) (ctdt+Ttdwt) ,
(3.1)
where S,b are m-dimensional column vectors; P, c are (d−m)-dimensional
column vectors; Σ is am×d-dimensional matrix; T is a (d−m)×d-dimensional
matrix; w is a d-dimensional Brownian motion; and diag (x) is a diagonal matrix
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with a vector x as the diagonal elements. The processes r,b, c,Σ, and T are
adapted to Ft. For the time variable t, we use such notations as bt and b (t)
interchangeably, and sometimes omit t for simplicity.
It is worth noting the meanings of performance, as three types of performance
variables exist. The first type is a flow variable. For example, consider net
profits, defined as the quantity of flow that a firm earns for a certain period.
We denote net profit from time a to time t by N (a, t). The differential of
N (a, t) with respect to t does not depend on the value of a, and we denote it
by n (t) := ∂N (a, t)/∂t . The meaning of n (t) is an instantaneous rate of net
profits at time t. We can express net profits for any period [a, b] by the equation:
N (a, b) =
∫ b
a
n (t) dt. (3.2)
Thus, the instantaneous rate of performance variables at time t are useful vari-
ables to describe various relationships around the first type performance vari-
ables. We adopt this as a basic variable. The performance variables Pt in (3.1)
belonging to this type are such instantaneous rates of performance variables at
time t. We denote by N1 the set of i such that for i ∈ N1, Pi belongs to this
type.
The second performance variable type is one that expresses the state of a
certain project, such as the development of a new drug. When modeling this
development process, we suppose that several stages exist in judging a success
or failure. In order for success at each stage, the performance variable must
exceed each threshold; if it fails to exceed the threshold, it cannot proceed.
When all thresholds are exceeded, this project eventually succeeds. This process
is modeled as follows. There are n time points, such as 0 = t0 < t1 < t2 < . . . <
tn ≤ T , and the following condition means the ith stage is successful:
P (ti)
P (ti−1)
≥ Ki. (3.3)
If the condition is not satisfied for some i, this project failed at that stage. The
ratio at the two time points is used so the state variables can indicate the success
or failure at each stage independent from each other. If we formulate (3.3) as
P (ti) ≥ Ki, a large value of P (ti−1) signifies a high probability of next-stage
success, and each step is not independent. We use N2 to denote the set of i such
that for i ∈ N2, Pi belongs to this type.
The third performance variable type expresses the instantaneous state at
each time, such as the market share. We use N3 to denote the set of i such that
for i ∈ N3, Pi belongs to this type.
When we formulate the SPPC in more detail in Section 4, we will return to
the distinction between these three types of performance variables.
The total volatility matrix
[
Σ⊤ T⊤
]⊤
is a d-dimensional square matrix.
We can assume it is a regular matrix without a loss of generality. We use w1 to
denote the first m Brownian motions of w , w2 the remaining d−m Brownian
motions, and F (1) a filtration generated by w1.
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3.2 An explicit solution to the dual problem
Assumption 3.1. r,b and Σ are adapted to F (1).
Assumption 3.1 implies Σ =
[
Σ1 0
]
. This form of matrix appears to be
restrictive, but this is not the case. As the covariance matrix V := ΣΣ⊤ of
the stock prices is a positive definite, an m-dimensional square root matrix
V1/2 exists. As V1/2 can reproduce V, we can use
[
V1/2 0
]
as the volatility
matrix.
Another implication of Assumption 3.1 is to exclude the possibility that the
performance variable P affects r,b and Σ1. However, such a model has no
analytical advantage when evaluating the SPPC’s price.
The first result is Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. We define an Rm-valued stochastic process θ and an R1-valued
stochastic process Z by the following equation
θ := Σ−11 (b+ d− r1m) ,
Zt := exp
(
−
∫ t
0
θ⊤dw1s −
∫ t
0
‖θ‖
2
ds
)
,
(3.4)
where d is an adapted Rm-valued dividend yield process. If Assumptions 2.1,
2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 3.1 hold, then in setting (3.1) we have
Y˜ ∗T (y) = ZT . (3.5)
We denote by Q a measure whose Radon-Nikodm derivative dQ/dP is ZT . We
call Q an optimal measure.
Proof. As the tradable assets’ price processes are adapted to F (1) by Assump-
tion 3.1, the information Ft/F
(1)
t does not improve the expected utility. We
can restrict the admissible wealth processes of the primary problem to those
adapted to F (1). Therefore, it is possible to solve the primary problem (2.4)
with only setting
dS0t = S0trtdt,
dSt = diag (St) (bdt+Σ1dw1t) .
(3.6)
As the maximal values of each primary problem with (3.1) and (3.6) are
equal, the uniqueness of the optimal solution to each primary problemwhich are
established by Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2leads to an equality between two optimal
solutions.
Further, Q is used to denote the unique equivalent local martingale measure
when we consider the primary problem within setting (3.6). The Radon-Nikodm
derivative dQ/dP coincides with ZT under setting (3.6); see Theorems 3.6.3 and
3.6.11 (6.23) in the work of Karatzas & Shreve (1998). Lemma 2.2 leads to
U ′
(
xX˜∗T (x)S0T
)
S0T = yZT . (3.7)
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Alternatively, by considering a general setting (3.1) in which we consider the
performance variables, Lemma 2.1 leads to
U ′
(
xX˜∗T (x)S0T
)
S0T = yY˜
∗
T (y) . (3.8)
We compare the right sides of (3.7) and (3.8) to obtain Y˜ ∗T (y) = ZT .
Next, we calculate the stochastic processes of setting (3.1) under Q. From
Gilzanov’s theorem, wˆ defined by (3.9) becomes a Brownian motion under Q
(Karatzas & Shreve 1998 Remark 1.5.3; Karatzas & Shreve 2012 Section 3.5).
dwˆ1t := θdt+ dw1t,
dwˆ2t := dw2t,
(3.9)
where
[
T1 T2
]
= T and T1 is a (d−m)×m-dimensional matrix. Substitut-
ing (3.4) and (3.9) into (3.1) creates the following equations:
dS0t = S0trtdt,
dSt = diag (St) ((r1m − d) dt+Σ1dwˆ1) ,
dPt = diag (Pt)
((
c−T1Σ
−1
1 (b+ d− r1m)
)
dt+T1dwˆ1 +T2dwˆ2
)
.
(3.10)
Ultimately, when we change the measure from P to Q, we must change the
drift terms of all variables. The changes to the stock prices’ drift terms are the
same as those in a complete market. We subtract the expected excess return
b + d − r1m from b. It is noteworthy in (3.10) that we must also change the
drift terms of the performance variables. We must subtract from c the expected
excess returns b+ d− r1m multiplied by T1Σ
−1
1 .
Further, Q is a so-called minimal martingale measure (MMM); see Bingham
& Kiesel (2013), Section 7.2.3. Previous studies utilized the MMM to find the
local risk minimization strategy, but did not analyze the relationship between
MMM and an optimal solution to the dual problem (Schweizer 1999). This
paper’s novelty lies in our evidence that the MMM is the optimal solution to
the dual problem under setting (3.1) and the assumptions from Theorem 3.2. 4
We then explain the meaning of T1Σ
−1
1 . Fix arbitrary 1 ≤ j ≤ d − m.
Denote by m-dimensional row vector βjS the betas of the multiple-regression
model, which explain dPj/Pj − cjdt (the random term of the instantaneous
change rate of the jth performance variable) by dSi/Si − bidt (1 ≤ i ≤ m),
the m random terms of the stock prices’ instantaneous change rates. Transform
T1Σ
−1
1 = T1Σ
⊤
1
(
Σ1Σ
⊤
1
)−1
. The jth row of T1Σ
⊤
1 is a row vector, the ith
4Karatzas et al. (1991) proved the optimality of MMM in the case of a power utility
function and the totally unhedgeable r,b and Σ1, which are incredibly restrictive assumptions
in application. See example 10.2 in the work of Karatzas et al. (1991). Another example
is a Hull-White stochastic volatility model, which assumes independence between the state
variables and stock price. This assumption is restrictive in estimating the SPPC’s theoretical
price. See Bingham & Kiesel (2013, p. 316).
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element of which is a covariance between dPj/Pj − cjdt and dSi/Si − bidt.
The matrix
(
Σ1Σ
⊤
1
)−1
is the inverse of the stock returns’ covariance matrix.
Therefore, the jth row of T1Σ
−1
1 is βjS . We call βjS multiple-regression betas
and denote T1Σ
−1
1 by BP S .
We can observe the product of the multiple regression betas and the expected
excess return is then subtracted from the drift term of the performance variable.
We summarize the above results as Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 3.1, the setting (3.1)
is expressed as the following equations driven by the Brownian motions wˆ under
Q:
dS0t = S0trtdt,
dSt = diag (St) ((r1m − d) dt+Σ1dwˆ1t) ,
dPt = diag (Pt) ((c−BP S (b+ d− r1m)) dt+T1dwˆ1t +T2dwˆ2t) .
(3.11)
Setting (3.11) indicates that we must subtract the expected returns propor-
tionate to the multiple-regression betas from the original drifts of all variables.
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We can use Theorem 3.2 to obtain the marginal utility based-price of B,
which satisfies the requirements of Lemma 2.3 as the expected value of BS−10T
with the stochastic process of (3.11).
3.3 An optimal portfolio model
The problem of Theorem 3.2 in application is that we require m expected excess
returns and (d−m)×m betas, which are not easily estimated. We can establish
a theorem with fewer parameters than Theorem 3.2 by adding assumptions that
are not restrictive in applying the theoretical price of SPPC.
Assumption 3.2. r,b and Σ1 are deterministic continuous functions of time
for [0, T ].
Assumption 3.2 excludes the models in which r,b and Σ1 depend on stock
prices. However, such a model has no analytical advantage when evaluating the
SPPC’s price. Therefore, Assumption 3.2 is not restrictive, and clearly implies
Assumption 3.1.
Assumption 3.2 leads to a strong claim regarding the optimal wealth process.
We need additional technical conditions, which we explain in Appendix A, called
Karatzas-Shreve conditions (Karatzas & Shreve 1998, Assumptions 3.8.1, 3.8.2).
Lemma 3.1. If Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.2 and Karatzas-Shreve condi-
tions hold, the Rm-valued process pi∗representing the proportion of the optimal
wealth process invested in each stockcan be expressed by
pi∗ = k
(
Σ1Σ
⊤
1
)−1
(b+ d− r1m) (3.12)
5For ith stock, its multiple-regression betas are defined in the same way as for performance
variables. It equals to m-dimensional raw vector 1i, the ith element of which is 1 and the
other element is 0.
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where k is some R-valued F (1) adapted process.
Proof. Karatzas & Shreve (1998) Theorem 3.8.8 (3.8.24).
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.3. Let b∗pi − r := pi
∗⊤ (b+ d− r1m) be the expected excess return
of the optimal wealth process, and β∗P pi :=
(
β∗1pi, · · · , β
∗
d−mpi
)⊤
be a (d−m)-
dimensional column vector whose jth element is a beta of a single-regression
model that explains dPj t/Pjt − cjdt (j = 1, · · · , d−m) by dX
∗
t /X
∗
t − b
∗
pidt,
where X∗ is the optimal wealth process. If Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.2
and Karatzas-Shreve conditions hold, then we have
dS0t = S0trtdt,
dSt = diag (St) ((r1m − d) dt+Σ1dwˆ1t) ,
dPt = diag (Pt) ((c− β
∗
P pi (b
∗
pi − r)) dt+T1dwˆ1t +T2dwˆ2t) .
(3.13)
Proof. Multiplying Σ1Σ
⊤
1 on both sides of (3.12) from the left, we have
Σ1Σ
⊤
1 pi
∗ = k (b+ d− r1m) . (3.14)
Multiplying pi∗⊤ on both sides of (3.14) from the left, we have
pi∗
⊤
Σ1Σ
⊤
1 pi
∗ = kpi∗⊤ (b+ d− r1m) = k (b
∗
pi − r) . (3.15)
Deleting k from (3.14) and (3.15), we have
b+ d− r1m =
Σ1Σ
⊤
1 pi
∗
pi∗⊤Σ1Σ
⊤
1 pi
∗
(b∗pi − r) . (3.16)
Multiplying T1Σ
−1
1 on both sides of (3.16) from the left, we have
T1Σ
−1
1 (b+ d− r1m) =
T1Σ
⊤
1 pi
∗
pi∗⊤Σ1Σ
⊤
1 pi
∗
(b∗pi − r) . (3.17)
As the Σ⊤1 pi
∗ appearing on the right side is a transposition of the volatil-
ity vector of the optimal portfolio pi∗, T1Σ
⊤
1 pi
∗ is a (d−m)-dimensional col-
umn vector, the jth element of which is a covariance between dPj t/Pjt −
cjdt (j = 1, · · · , d−m) and dX
∗
t /X
∗
t − b
∗
pidt. The matrix pi
∗⊤Σ1Σ
⊤
1 pi
∗ in the
denominator on the right side is the variance of dXˆ/Xˆ . Therefore, we have
T1Σ
−1
1 (b+ d− r1m) = β
∗
P pi (b
∗
pi − r) . (3.18)
Substituting (3.18) into (3.10) leads to (3.13).
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By Theorem 3.3, we need not estimate the expected excess returns and
multiple-regression betas of stocks. Instead, it is sufficient to estimate the ex-
pected excess returns and single-regression beta of the optimal portfolio. This
is because the expected excess returns and the betas of the stocks invested in an
optimal portfolio, consistent with those of the optimal portfolio, automatically
reflect on the performance variable drift adjustments.
In practice, enough precedent exists to adopt a stock index as the optimal
portfolio. Many studies have confirmed that it is difficult to find active man-
agement funds that stably outperform the stock index (Carhart 1997, Fama
& French 2010). When considering an investor whose optimal portfolio is the
stock index, we can regard such an investor’s estimation as both long-term and
qualified in the above sense.
As many financial institutions announce prospective market index returns,
it is relatively easy to estimate the market index’s expected excess returns.
3.4 Two features of the optimal measure
The optimal measure implies two features in the stochastic processes (3.11) and
(3.13). The first feature is that the performance variable’s drift term should
change by the expected excess returns on invested stocks or the optimal portfolio
multiplied by their betas. Economically, this change occurs because the relative
advantage of the investment in the SPPC, compared to that in the tradable
assets, affects the SPPC’s theoretical price. For an investor who purchases
the SPPC by decreasing wealth investing in tradable assets, the higher the
stocks’ expected excess returns, the higher the SPPC’s expected return must
be. Ultimately, the theoretical price must decrease; therefore, the probability
of achieving goals must also decrease. In adjusting the performance variables’
drift terms along with (3.11) or (3.13), the higher the stocks’ expected excess
returns, the lower the probability that the performance variables will achieve
goals and the price; thus, it is consistent. If the price does not decrease, the
investor can increase the expected utility by selling the SPPC short.
Neglecting the betas means we assume the investor is risk neutral, which is
empirically illogical and leads to the conclusion that the investor can increase
the expected utility if the stocks’ excess returns are positive. We must be careful
not to unconsciously fall into such an unreasonable assumption.
We must estimate betas carefully. If the performance variable includes sales
or profits and we use the market index as the optimal portfolio, the betas are
positive, as the market index follows the same direction as the economic trend,
and sales and profits are affected by economic trends.
The second feature is that the performance variables’ drift adjustments do
not depend on the type of utility function. Consider that we used the utility
function to define the marginal utility-based price; it is therefore unexpected
that the drift adjustment in (3.11) or (3.13) does not need information on the
utility function.
There are two reasons for this occurrence. First, although Y˜ ∗T (y) depends on
the utility function in general, it does not under Assumption 3.1 (see Theorem
14
3.2). Second, we define the marginal utility-based price with q = 0. The
marginal utility with respect to q is
∂
∂q
E [U (X∗T + qB)]−
∂
∂q
u (x− qp) = E [U ′ (X∗T + qB)B]− u
′ (x− qp) p.
(3.19)
The first term is a marginal expected utility due to the change in terminal
wealth, and the second term is as such due to the change in initial wealth
invested in tradable assets. Evaluating (3.19) at q = 0 leads to
E [U ′ (X∗T )B]− u
′ (x) p. (3.20)
Substituting (2.12) and y = u′ (x) into the above equation, we have
E [U ′ (X∗T )B]− u
′ (x) p = E
[
yY˜ ∗ (y)BS−10T
]
− yp = y
(
E
[
Y˜ ∗ (y)BS−10T
]
− p
)
.
(3.21)
The marginal expected utility equals zero when p = E
[
Y˜ ∗ (y)BS−10T
]
.
Simultaneously, we can see that if q 6= 0, then
∂
∂q
E [U (X∗T + qB)]−
∂
∂q
u (x− qp) 6= y
(
E
[
Y˜ ∗ (y)BS−10T
]
− p
)
. (3.22)
This inequality means that if we define a marginal utility-based price at a non-
zero q (the utility indifference price), then E
[
Y˜ ∗ (y)BS−10T
]
is not a price that
makes the marginal expected utility equal zero at a non-zero q. We can guess
that a utility indifference price will depend on the utility function and initial
wealth x even if Assumption 3.1 holds. However, no agreement seemingly exists
regarding the type of utility function and what size of initial wealth is appropri-
ate. This disagreement means the marginal utility-based price at q = 0 is the
only sensible definition of the theoretical price.
4 The Theoretical Price of SPPC
4.1 Formula of the theoretical price of SPPC
We then formulate SPPC’s theoretical price by considering only stocks and
performance variables that affect the SPPC payoff. The difference between
stocks and performance variables is that the former can be traded on the market,
but the latter cannot. Thus,
dS0t = S0trtdt,
dSt = diag (St) ((rt1m − dt) dt+Σ1tdwˆ1t) ,
dPt = diag (Pt) (µtdt+Ttdwˆt) .
(4.1)
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where µt is the drift coefficient after the beta adjustments in (3.11) or (3.13).
We used the same notations as (3.11) in a different meaning to simplify the
description. Further, we consider the issuer’s stock as well as all stocks that
affect the payoff. For example, if the formula for the exercise price is
the issuer’s stock price on the grant date×
a market index on the vesting date
a market index on the grant date
,
(4.2)
we include a stock index in the stocks. If the formula for the exercise price is
the issuer’s stock price on the grant date
×
a competitor′s stock price on the vesting date
a competitor′s stock price on the grant date
,
(4.3)
we include the competitor’s stock in the stocks.
Let m and n be the number of stocks and performance variables in (4.1),
respectively, and d := m+ n. Let Tv < T be the vesting date.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, denote by Ii the variable that assumes a value of one when
the condition of the ith performance variable is satisfied, and zero when it is
not. We can describe Ii by using indicator functions and denoting each goal by
Ki, as follows:
Ii = 1{PiSUM≥Ki} for i ∈ N1 (4.4)
where PiSUM :=
∫ bi
ai
Piudu and [ai, bi] ⊂ [0, Tv] is the accounting period,
Ii = 1{Pi(tik)/Pi(tik−1) ≥Ki}, 1 ≤ k ≤ Li for i ∈ N2 (4.5)
where
(
0 = ti0 < . . . < ti1 < . . . < tiLi
)
⊂ [0, Tv] are time points to judge suc-
cess or failure, and
Ii = 1{Pi(Tv)≥Ki} for i ∈ N3. (4.6)
We call PiSUM a period-sum.
We use C to denote the payoff determined at time T of the award if the
conditions are satisfied. Moreover, C is an F
(1)
T measurable random variable.
The form of C depends on the award’s content. If the award provides stocks,
then C = ST , where ST is the issuer’s stock price at time T . If the award
provides stock options, the form of C can be specified only after the option’s
content is specified. It might be a simple American call option with an exercise
price K and payoff max (St −K, 0) exp
(∫ T
t rudu
)
for Tv ≤ t ≤ T , or it might
be an exotic option (see Shreve 2004 for the pricing of such options).
The SPPC payoff is 6
6 If the excise price depends on the performance condition, the payoff of such an option
is max(ST − K11{P≤K} − K21{P≥K}) where K1 and K2 are exercise prices and K is a
performance goal, which is the same as max(ST − K1)1{P≤K} + max(ST − K2)1{P≥K}.
Thus, such an option is a group of options with a payoff of max(ST − K1)1{P≤K} and
max(ST −K2)1{P≥K}. We can analyze this in the same manner as (4.7).
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B := C
n∏
i=1
Ii. (4.7)
The product of Iis means that multiple goals must be simultaneously achieved
for the award to be vested.
We can observe that (4.7) will satisfy the requirements of Lemma 2.3. First,
we will demonstrate there is a maximal strategy X ∈ X (1), satisfying the
condition B ≤ aXT with some constant a > 0.
As C is adapted to F
(1)
T , using the standard discussion of the complete
market reveals there is a wealth process X ∈ X (1) such that C = xXT where
x = EQ
[
CS−10T
]
; thus, B = C
n∏
i=1
Ii ≤ C = xXT . Further, we indicate such X
is a maximal strategy. If this X is not the case, then an admissible strategy
X ′ ∈ X (1) exists that dominates X , namely, XT ≤ X
′
T and XT < X
′
T with
some positive probability. Multiplying both sides by S−10T ZT and taking the
expected value of both sides under P, we have EQ
[
X˜T
]
< EQ
[
X˜ ′T
]
. However,
as both X and X ′ are elements of X (1), EQ
[
X˜T
]
= EQ
[
X˜ ′T
]
= 1, which is a
contradiction. Therefore, X is a maximal strategy.
Next, we will demonstrate that regarding the above maximal strategyX , ZX˜
is a uniformly integrable martingale. The relative wealth process X˜ satisfies
dX˜t = X˜tpiΣ1dwˆ1t (4.8)
where pi represents the proportion of current wealth invested in each stock
(Shreve 2004, 5.2.27). As the Ito Integral is a martingale (Shreve 2004, Theorem
4.3.1(iv)), X˜ is a Q-martingale and ZX˜ is a P-martingale. Thus, we have
ZtX˜t = E
[
ZT X˜T |Ft
]
. Further, E
[∣∣∣ZT X˜T ∣∣∣] <∞, because
E
[∣∣∣ZT X˜T ∣∣∣] = E [ZT X˜T ] = E [ZT X˜T |F0 ] = Z0X˜0 = 1. (4.9)
The conditional expectation of a random variable in L1, given Ft, is a uniformly
integrable martingale (Williams 1991, 13.4).
As we have confirmed that the SPPC’s payoff satisfies all requirements of
Lemma 2.3, we can apply Lemma 2.3 to the SPPC’s payoff. The SPPC’s price
is
p := EQ
[
S−10T C
n∏
i=1
Ii
]
. (4.10)
4.2 How to improve the estimation
As no analytical formula exists to express the probability distribution of the
period-sum PiSUM , we must calculate (4.10) using the Monte Carlo method if
the SPPC contains a type 1 performance variable.
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The concept of a period-product of the performance variable is useful in
evaluating the theoretical price. We define a period-product of the performance
variable as
PiPROD := (bi − ai) exp
(
1
bi − ai
∫ bi
ai
logPiudu
)
. (4.11)
We can indicate the meaning of PiPROD/(bi − ai) as a continuous time version
of the geometric mean of the performance variables at discrete time points.
Divide a period [a, b] into t0 = ai, · · · , tk = ai + k∆t, · · · tn = bi (k = 0, · · · , n)
where ∆t := (bi − ai)/n . The geometric mean of
(
Piai , · · · , Pitk , · · · , Pibi
)
is
(
n∏
k=0
Ptk
) 1
n+1
=: G. (4.12)
Then
logG =
1
n+ 1
n∑
k=0
logPtk =
n
n+ 1
1
bi − ai
n∑
k=0
logPtk∆t
→
1
bi − ai
∫ bi
ai
logPiudu as n→∞.
(4.13)
Thus, we have
G→ exp
(
1
bi − ai
∫ bi
ai
logPiudu
)
=
PiPROD
bi − ai
as n→∞. (4.14)
Henceforth, we will call the original SPPC conditional to the period-sum the
period-sum payment and the SPPC conditional to the period-product the period-
product payment . We assume Li = 1 for i ∈ N2 to simplify the description.
Let N0 := (i)1≤i≤m. The payoff of the period-product payment is
C
n∏
i=1
I ′i (4.15)
where I ′i = 1{PiPROD≥Ki} for i ∈ N1 and I
′
i = Ii for i ∈ N2 ∪N3.
As we will note in Appendix B, a d-dimensional random vector
x :=
(
(logSi (T ))i∈N0 , (logPiPROD)i∈N1 , (logPi (ti1)/Pi (ti0) )i∈N2 , (logPi (Tv))i∈N3
)⊤
(4.16)
has a d-dimensional normal distribution, for which an analytical formula using
instantaneous parameters exists.
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The period-product payment price is
pPROD := E
Q
[
S−10T C
n∏
i=1
I ′i
]
. (4.17)
We can calculate pPROD more quickly and accurately by using the analytical
distribution formula of x rather than the Monte Carlo method, which uses
random numbers step by step with many paths. We call this price estimated
with the analytical distribution formula a quasi-analytical theoretical price. In
the case of n = 1 and m = 1, we can calculate this by combining the analytical
formula and numerical integral. In other cases, we can directly generate the
samples of x as random numbers. This calculation takes much less time to
obtain the same number of samples than does the case in which we generate
random numbers step by step with paths from t = 0 to t = T .
We can utilize pPROD as a control variable to improve the accuracy in es-
timating the period-sum payment theoretical price p according to the following
formula:
the estimation of the theoretical price of the period-sum payment
= the average of the theoretical price of the period-sum payment over paths
+ the quasi-analytical theoretical price of the period-product payment
− the average of the theoretical price of the period-product payment over paths
(4.18)
The concept of the period-product has another use, as we cannot directly
observe the instantaneous value for the type 1 performance variables; we can
only observe the discrete samples of the period-sum for each accounting pe-
riod. All the model parameters relate to instantaneous variables, but these
cannot be directly estimated. Let k be the number of observable accounting
periods. Given the instantaneous variable parameters (such as volatility or
correlation, among others), we generate a set of period-sum samples D
(h)
SUM :={
P
(h)
iSUM (t1, t2) , · · · , P
(h)
iSUM (tk, tk+1)
}
for i ∈ N1 of the h-th trial by the Monte
Carlo method and obtain one statistic f
(
D
(h)
SUM
)
of the hth trial. We repeat
this procedure H times and obtain the average eSUM :=
∑
h f
(
D
(h)
SUM
)
/H .
Similarly, we obtain ePROD :=
∑
h f
(
D
(h)
PROD
)
/H . At the same time, we know
the analytical value corresponding to ePROD through the above analytical dis-
tribution formula, which is denoted by aPROD. We can use the parameter of
the period-product as a control variable to improve the accuracy in estimating
the period-sum parameter:
The estimation of the period-sum parameter = eSUM − ePROD + aPROD.
(4.19)
Thus, we determine the instantaneous variable parameters so the left side of
(4.19) agrees with the real observation values.
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Figure 1: The number of accounting periods and correlations.
Many points of caution are involved in estimating parameters. Fix arbitrarily
1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n; Si and Pj are denoted as S and P for simplicity.
1. When we estimate the correlation between the stock price and performance
variable, as the observable performance variable is the period-sum of each
accounting period [ti, ti+1] (i = 1, · · · , k), we must use the period-sum of
the stock price in the corresponding period
SSUM (ti, ti+1) :=
∫ ti+1
ti
Sudu (i = 1, · · · , k) . (4.20)
When the number of issued shares changes during these periods, the
period-sums of the market capitalization are appropriate variables.
2. It is correct to compute the sample correlation of the ratio’s logarithm of
successive two period-sums(
log
SSUM (ti+1, ti+2)
SSUM (ti, ti+1)
, log
PSUM (ti+1, ti+2)
PSUM (ti, ti+1)
)
(i = 1, · · · , k − 1) ,
(4.21)
not one of the period-sum itself
(SSUM (ti, ti+1) , PSUM (ti, ti+1)) (i = 1, · · · , k − 1) . (4.22)
The latter correlation converges to one as the number of the accounting
periods increases because the drift term eventually dominates. Fig. 1 il-
lustrates the changes in the two sample correlations when the number of
accounting periods increases, calculated by a Monte Carlo Simulation with
20
20,000 paths. We assume the population correlation is 0.3. Although the
sample correlation of the ratio’s logarithm converges to a population cor-
relation of 0.3 as the accounting period number increases, while the sample
correlation from (4.20) increases separate from the population correlation.
3. The sample correlation is not an unbiased estimator. The approximate
value of the unbiased estimator of the population correlation is the follow-
ing equation (Olkin & Pratt 1958):
ρˆ
(
1 +
(
1− ρˆ2
)
2n− 6
)
, (4.23)
where ρˆ is a sample correlation and n is the number of samples, which is
k − 1 in our case.
4. When using a stock index as the optimal portfolio, a single-regression beta
of the optimal portfolio is necessary; we can use the following formula:
the estimation of the population correlation
between the stock index and the performance variable
×
the estimation of volatility of the performance variable
the estimation of volatility of the stock index
.
(4.24)
We must estimate the population correlation between the stock index and
the performance variable carefully as the estimation of that between the
stock price and the performance variable.
5. We use the unbiased variance of samples of the ratio’s logarithm of suc-
cessive two period-sums as the population variance of the performance
variable: (
log
PSUM (ti+1, ti+2)
PSUM (ti, ti+1)
)
(i = 1 · · · , k − 1) . (4.25)
We use the square root of the obtained population variance as an estimate
of the performance variable’s volatility.
6. We estimate the drift coefficient ci without beta-adjusting of the type 1
performance variable, by using the actual result and the market-consensus
forecast of the period-sum in the following equation:
the market-consensus forecast of the period-sum of year Y
=the realized period-sum of year Y0 × exp (ci (Y − Y0)) .
(4.26)
If there are multiple periods of performance goals, then the term-structure
of the drift coefficients can be used.
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5 Implications for Accounting Standards
The current accounting standards for share-based payments are as follows (Stock-
Based Payments, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (R)):
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1. Measure the fair value of the awards on a grant date as with no perfor-
mance conditions. Using an equation similar to (4.10), we set the below
A as the fair value:
A := EQ
[
S−10T C
]
(5.1)
2. The company judges whether it is probable to meet these conditions on
its grant date.
3. When judged as probable, allocate the fair value proportionately over the
remaining service period.
4. When judged as improbable, do not recognize compensation cost.
5. When the performance condition results are known, if the performance
conditions are not achieved, already recognized compensation cost will be
reversed; in the case of achievement, unrecognized compensation cost will
be immediately recorded.
We compare the current and new standards by defining new standards using
an accounting process that measures the awards’ fair value with the theoretical
price p of (4.10), which is always recognized as compensation cost on the grant
date. In calculating p, we use the drift of the original probability distribution,
minus the beta multiplied by an optimal portfolio’s excess expected returns. As
the probability of goal achievement in the original distribution is less than one
and an additional downward beta adjustment exists, p would be smaller than
A. Further, p and A only coincide when the original distribution’s achievement
probability is one and the beta is zero. In an extreme case, in which the original
distribution’s goal achievement is one or zero, no performance condition-based
motivation exists; thus, we are interested in the range, such as from 30% to
70%, for example. In this case, p can be considered considerably smaller than A.
Further, compensation cost costs doed not change, as they are always recognized
regardless of whether the performance conditions are satisfied.
For example, consider that compensation cost for N years and the perfor-
mance condition results will be known in the Nth year. Compensation cost
under the current standards can only change in the Nth year. We focus on the
difference between recognized compensation cost in the Nth (cN ) and N − 1th
years (cN−1). Further, Ig denotes a variable that assumes a value of one when
the goal is achieved and zero when it is not, and Ip denotes a variable that
assumes a value of one when the company judges on the grant date that goal
achievement is probable, and zero when the company judges this as improbable.
7The IFRS 2 Share-Based Payment is essentially the same.
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As total compensation cost to be recognized for N years depends only on goal
achievement, we have
AIg = cN + (N − 1) cN−1. (5.2)
At the same time, cN−1 depends only on the company’s judgment:
cN−1 =
AIp
N
. (5.3)
From (5.2) and (5.3), we obtain
cN − cN−1 = AIg − (N − 1) cN−1− cN−1 = AIg −NcN−1 = A (Ig − Ip) . (5.4)
Therefore, when Ip is 1, cN − cN−1 is −A or 0, and when Ip is 0, then
cN − cN−1 is 0 or A. The volatility (standard deviation) of cN − cN−1 is√
α (1− α)A, (5.5)
where α is the goal achievement probability. We observe that the volatility of
cN − cN−1 depends only on the size of A and the goal achievement probability
α, and does not depend on the company’s choice.
The expected value of total compensation cost is αA, which also depends
only on A and the probability of achieving the goal α, and not on the company’s
choice.
The problems with the current standards are as follows:
1. Volatile compensation cost: On the one hand, volatile compensation cost
under the current standards is inevitable, as indicated by (5.5). On the
other hand, compensation cost is constant under the new standards.
2. Over-recognition of compensation cost: In the favorable case in which
goals are achieved, if the company can correctly predict this achievement
and no volatility effect occurs on the income statement, the larger com-
pensation cost is recognized under the current standards, rather than the
new. If p is 40% of A, the current standards compensation cost is 2.5
times the new standards. Under the current standards, the only unfavor-
able case in which the goal is not achieved involves a cost lower than under
the new standards.
3. Inconsistent accounting objectives: Consider two awards. Award X has a
low probability of goal achievement and many exercisable shares. Award
Y has a high probability of goal achievement and few exercisable shares.
Suppose the service provider is indifferent to both awards. The purpose of
measuring the award’s fair value is to measure the fair value of the service,
and to recognize it as compensation cost. This is in line with (ASC 718-10-
10-1) 8 , which notes, The objective of accounting for transactions under
share-based payment arrangements with employees is [] to recognize in the
8http://guides.newman.baruch.cuny.edu/FASB Codification/citing
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financial statements the employee services received [...] and the related
cost to the entity as those services are consumed.” The difference between
the fair value of awards X and Y under the current standards is
(qX − qY )A (5.6)
where qX(Y ) is the number of exercisable shares for award X (or Y). Al-
ternatively, the difference under the new standards is
qXpX − qY pY = (qX − qY ) pX + qY (pX − pY ) (5.7)
where pX(Y ) is the theoretical price per exercisable share of award X (or
Y). The first term on the right side of (5.7) is smaller than (5.6) because
pX is much smaller than A, and the second term is negative because
pX is much smaller than pY . Thus, qXpX − qY pY is much smaller than
(qX − qY )A. Ideally, the measured values for the same services will be
the same regardless of the compensation scheme, and the new standards
are clearly superior to the current standards.
4. Distorting a company’s optimal award selection: A company has a bias to
avoid high-risk compensation awards. If a company adopts award X and
judges it as probable, the profit decreases by large compensation cost. If
the company judges this as improbable, this conveys to the market that
this goal will be difficult to achieve. Both outcomes are not preferable for
the company. Therefore, the company has a bias to adopt the low-risk
award Y. Such a dilemma is lessened in the new standards, which have a
low possibility of distorting the company’s decision.
5. The significant volatility of a difficult project’s compensation cost: In cases
that involve the development of new technologies or drugs, for example,
the goal completely differs from such goals as the earnings per share growth
rate, which the company can freely select as its goal and the probability
of achievement from a continuum. As achieving the goal is difficult, it is
necessary to increase the benefit obtained at the time of achievement. In
the above example, the company has no choice other than to select the
award X. Under the current standards, because A is large, compensation
cost is significantly volatile, as indicated by (5.5). This volatility decreases
the income statement’s reliability. Under the new standards, as recognized
compensation cost is constant, the income statement retains its reliability.
When the compulsory use of the fair value method was mandated in 2004,
the current standards were the only choice, as no model properly reflected per-
formance conditions in its theoretical pricing. However, once a model appro-
priately reflects performance conditions, there is no reason to keep the current
standards. We posit it is worthwhile to consider the new standards proposed
herein as well as their improved version.
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6 Conclusions
Although the SPPC has experienced prominent growth, theoretical pricing has
not been sufficiently studied. We examined previous studies’ results regarding
the theoretical price of contingent claims in an incomplete market, and incor-
porated the concept of a marginal utility-based price. We then adopted an
approach to restrict the stochastic processes to a certain class, which is non-
restrictive and hence aggregable in application. We demonstrated a need for
consistent change in the probability distributions of stock prices as well as the
performance variables that affect the payoff, then developed two models. The
second model, which uses an optimal portfolio, is incredibly convenient and per-
suasive in its application, as it uses only a few parameters. We then provided
a method to estimate these parameters and improve the estimation. Simul-
taneously, we demonstrated that the current accounting standardsspecifically,
the Share-Based Payment No. 123 (R)have some defects, which our theoretical
price model can greatly improve.
A Karatzas-Shreve conditions
We call the following conditions Karatzas-Shreve conditions (Karatzas & Shreve
1998, Assumptions 3.8.1, 3.8.2).
1. The processes r and ‖θ‖ are Ho¨lder continuous; namely, for some K > 0
and ρ ∈ (0, 1) we have
|r (t1)− r (t2)| ≤ K|t1 − t2|
ρ, |‖θ (t1)‖ − ‖θ (t2)‖| ≤ K|t1 − t2|
ρ (A.1)
for all t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ].
2. Some positive constants k1, k2 exist, such that
k1 ≤ ‖θ (t)‖ ≤ k2, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] . (A.2)
The utility function U and the inverse function of the marginal utility I :=
(U ′)−1 satisfy:
1. (Polynomial growth of I) A constant γ > 0 exists, such that
I (y) ≤ γ + yγ ; (A.3)
2. (polynomial growth of U (I) A constant γ > 0 exists, such that
U (I (y)) ≥ −γ − yγ , ∀y ∈ (0,∞) . (A.4)
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B An analytical distribution formula
We assume Li = 1 for i ∈ N2 to simplify the description. Let N0 = (i)1≤i≤m.
We can illustrate that a d-dimensional random column vector(
(logSi (T ))i∈N0 , (logPiPROD)i∈N1 , (logPi (ti1)/Pi (ti0) )i∈N2 , (logPi (Tv))i∈N3
)⊤
=: (xhi)
⊤
0≤h≤3,i∈Nh
=: x
(B.1)
has a d-dimensional normal distribution.
We use the moment-generating function of x to prove this. As preparation,
it is necessary to analyze each random variable.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ d, let di be a dividend yield of the ith stock, σij
be the (i, j)th element of
[
Σ1 0
]
, and wˆj be the jth element of wˆ.
For i ∈ N0, we have
logSi (T ) = m0i +
d∑
j=1
∫ T
0
T˜ 0ij (t) dwˆj (t) (B.2)
where
m0i := logSi (0) +
∫ T
0

r (t)− di (t)− 1
2
d∑
j=1
σ2ij (t)

 dt (B.3)
and
T˜ 0ij (t) := σij (t) . (B.4)
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ d, let µi be the ith element of µ in (4.1), Tij be
the (i, j)th element of T, and σ2i be
d∑
j=1
T 2ij .
From (3.1), we have
logPi (t) = logPi (0) +
∫ t
0
(
µi (u)−
1
2
σ2i (u)
)
du+
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
Tij (u)dwˆj (u).
(B.5)
For i ∈ N1, substituting (B.5) into the right side of the logarithm of (4.11)
yields
logPiPROD = log (bi − ai)Pi (0) +
1
bi − ai
∫ bi
ai
∫ t
0
(
µi (u)−
1
2
σ2i (u)
)
dudt
+
1
bi − ai
∫ bi
ai

 d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
Tij (u) dwˆj (u)

 dt.
(B.6)
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We then apply a generalized form of Fubini’s theorem for stochastic integrals
(Heath & Morton 1992) to the random terms in (B.6) to have∫ bi
ai
(∫ t
0
Tij (u) dwˆj (u)
)
dt =
∫ bi
ai
(bi − u)Tij (u) dwˆj (u) + (bi − ai)
∫ ai
0
Tij (u) dwˆj (u)
=
∫ T
0
(
(bi − u)Tij (u) 1{ai≤u≤bi} + (bi − ai)Tij (u) 1{0≤u≤ai}
)
dwˆj (u).
(B.7)
Substituting (B.7) into (B.6), we have
logPiPROD = m1i +
d∑
j=1
∫ T
0
T˜ 1ij (t) dwˆj (t), (B.8)
where
m1i := log (bi − ai)Pi (0) +
1
bi − ai
∫ bi
ai
(∫ t
0
(
µi (u)−
1
2
σ2i (u)
)
du
)
dt (B.9)
and
T˜ 1ij (t) :=
(
(bi − t) Tij (t) 1{ai≤t≤bi} + (bi − ai)Tij (t) 1{0≤t≤ai}
)
bi − ai
. (B.10)
For i ∈ N2, from (B.5), we have
log
Pi (ti1)
Pi (ti0)
= m2i +
d∑
j=1
∫ T
0
T˜ 2ij (t) dwˆj (t), (B.11)
where
m2i :=
∫ ti1
ti0
(
µi (t)−
1
2
σ2i (t)
)
dt (B.12)
and
T˜ 2ij (t) := Tij (t) 1{ti0≤t≤ti1}. (B.13)
For i ∈ N3, from (B.5), we have
logPi (Tv) = m3i +
d∑
j=1
∫ T
0
T˜ 3ij (t) dwˆj (t), (B.14)
where
m3i := logPi (0) +
∫ Tv
0
(
µi (t)−
1
2
σ2i (t)
)
dt, (B.15)
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and
T˜ 3ij (t) := T3ij (t) 1{0≤t≤Tv}. (B.16)
Let θ :=
(
(θ0i)1≤i≤m, (θ1i)i∈N1 , (θ2i)i∈N2 , (θ3i)i∈N3
)⊤
be a column vector,
which is the coefficient in the moment-generating function of x. The moment-
generating function M (θ) of x is
M (θ) =EQ
[
exp
(
θ⊤x
)]
=exp

 ∑
h,i∈Nh
θhimhi

 ∏
1≤j≤d
EQ

exp


∫ T
0
∑
h,i∈Nh
θhiT˜hij (t)dwˆj (t)




=exp

 ∑
h,i∈Nh
θhimhi

 ∏
1≤j≤d
exp


1
2
∫ T
0

 ∑
h,i∈Nh
θhiT˜hij (t)


2
dt


=exp

 ∑
h,i∈Nh
θhimhi


×
∏
1≤j≤d
exp

12
∫ T
0

 ∑
h,i∈Nh
∑
h′,i′∈Nh′
θhiθh′ i′ T˜hij (t) T˜h′i′ j (t)

 dt


=exp

 ∑
h,i∈Nh
θhimhi


× exp

12
d∑
j=1

∫ T
0

 ∑
h,i∈Nh
∑
h′,i′∈Nh′
θhiθh′ i′ T˜hij (t) T˜h′i′ j (t)

 dt




=exp

 ∑
h,i∈Nh
θhimhi


× exp

12
∑
h,i∈Nh
∑
h′,i′∈Nh′
θhiθh′ i′
∫ T
0

 d∑
j=1
T˜hij (t) T˜h′i′ j (t)

 dt

 .
(B.17)
We used the moment-generating function of a normal random variable for the third
equality of (B.17) (Shreve 2004, 4.4.30).
The last side in (B.17) indicates x has a d-dimensional normal distribu-
tion, which has means of (mhi)0≤h≤3,i∈Nh and covariances between for i ∈ Nh
(0 ≤ h ≤ 3) and for i′ ∈ Nh′ (0 ≤ h
′ ≤ 3) of
∫ T
0
∑
j T˜hij (t) T˜h′i′ j (t)dt. We can
express every covariance using the instantaneous covariances. For example, we
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have∫ T
0
∑
j
T˜ 0ij (t) T˜ 1kj (t)dt
=
∫ bk
ak
(bi − t)
∑
j σij (t)Tkj (t)dt+ (bk − ak)
∫ ak
0
∑
j σij (t)Tkj (t)dt
bk − ak
,
(B.18)
where
∑
j σij (t) Tkj (t) is an instantaneous covariance between dSi/Si and dPk/Pk .
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